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Contents
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Failure
Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
Part one of a series.
The following is
an excerpt from The Reliability
Engineering Handbook by Bryan
Dodson and Dennis Nolan,
© Quality Publishing. It may be ordered from the Quality
Publishing Order Form..
Failure Mode, Effects,
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a powerful design analysis tool that
is used to increase system reliability. It can be applied during the initial
design phase or to existing equipment. To be more effective, the FMECA
should relate to the nature of the design process itself. In either case,
it considers overall design, operating, and service problems, while at
the same time addressing process and safety problems.
If used as a design tool,
the benefit of FMECA depends upon the timeliness in which information
is communicated in the early design phase. Timeliness is probably the
most important factor in differentiating between effective and ineffective
implementation of the FMECA. The efforts and sophistication of the approach
used depend greatly on the requirements of each individual program. In
any case, the FMECA should contribute to the overall program decision.
7.2 Environmental
requirements and influence
When the FMECA team members
are properly selected, the FMECA process will address all problems concerning
design, manufacturing, process, safety, and environment. The consequences
of these problems are addressed during the study of the Failure Mode during
the FMECA. Preventive measures for failures where an individuals
well-being in the workplace is concerned should always be given top priority.
According to John Moubray (1991), "A failure mode has safety consequences
if it causes a loss of function or other damage which could hurt or kill
someone."
The overall design must
consider how the environment influences the system during testing, storage,
installing, and operating. When considering the failure mode effects,
think about the impact on society in general if the failure happened.
Society may, in some cases, be considered as a customer because if the
product is not accepted due to environmental effects, it may not be successful.
"A failure mode has environmental consequences if it causes a loss
of function or other damage which could lead to the breach of any known
environmental standard or regulation," (Moubray, 1991).
7.3 Differences
between part function, part failure mechanism, failure effect, failure
detection, and failure mode
The definitions which
follow form the fundamentals of FMECAs. These definitions will enable
the reader to understand the differences between Part Function, Part Failure
Mechanism, Failure Effect, Failure Detection, and Failure Modes. These
definitions were taken from MIL-STD-1629.
1. Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA)A procedure by which each potential
failure mode in a system is analyzed to determine the results, or effects
thereof, on the system and to classify each potential failure mode according
to its severity.
2. Failure modeThe
manner by which a failure is observed. Generally describes the way the
failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation.
3. Failure effectThe
consequence(s) a failure mode has on the operation, function, or status
of an item. Failure effects are usually classified according to how the
entire system is impacted.
4. Failure causeThe
physical or chemical process, design defects, part misapplication, quality
defects, or other processes that are the basic reason for failure or which
initiate the physical process by which deterioration proceeds to failure.
5. EnvironmentsThe
conditions, circumstances, influences, stresses and combinations thereof,
surrounding and affecting systems or equipment during storage, handling,
transportation, testing, installation, and use in standby status and operations.
6. Detection mechanismThe
means or methods by which a failure can be discovered by an operator under
normal system operation or can be discovered by the maintenance crew by
some diagnostic action.
7. SeverityThe
consequences of a failure as a result of a particular failure mode. Severity
considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by
the degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately
occur.
8. CriticalityA
relative measure of the consequences of a failure mode and its frequency
of occurrence.
9. Criticality
analysis (CA)A procedure by which each potential failure
mode is ranked according to the combined influence of severity and probability
of occurrence.
10. FMECA-Maintainability
informationA procedure by which each potential failure
is analyzed to determine how the failure is detected and the actions to
be taken to repair the failure.
11. Single failure
pointThe failure of an item that would result in failure
of the system and is not compensated for by redundancy or alternative
operational procedure.
12. Undetectable
failureA postulated failure mode in the FMEA for which
there is no failure detection method by which the operator is made aware
of the failure.
13. FMECA planningPlanning
the FMECA work involves the contractors procedures for implementing
their specified requirements. Planning should include updating to reflect
design changes and analysis results. Worksheet formats, ground rules,
assumptions, identification of the level of analysis, failure definitions,
and identification of coincident use of the FMECA by the contractor and
other organizational elements should also be considered.
14. Ground rules
and assumptionsThe ground rules identify the FMECA approach
(e.g., hardware, functional or combination), the lowest level to be analyzed,
and include statements of what might constitute a failure in terms of
performance criteria. Every effort should be made to identify and record
all ground rules and analysis assumptions prior to initiation of the analysis;
however, ground rules and analysis assumptions may be adjusted as requirements
change.
15. Analysis approachVariations
in design complexity and available data will generally dictate the analysis
approach to be used. There are two primary approaches for the FMECA. One
is the hardware approach that lists individual hardware items and analyzes
their possible failure modes. The other is the functional approach that
recognizes that every item is designed to perform a number of outputs.
The outputs are listed and their failures analyzed. For more complex systems,
a combination of the functional and hardware approaches may be considered.
16. Hardware approachThe
hardware approach is normally used when hardware items can be uniquely
identified from schematics, drawings, and other engineering and design
data. This approach is recommended for use in a part level up approach
often referred to as the bottom-up approach.
17. Functional
approachThe functional approach is normally used when hardware
items cannot be uniquely identified or when system complexity requires
analysis from the top down.
18. Level of analysisThe
level of analysis applies to the system hardware or functional level at
which failures are postulated. In other words, how the system being analyzed
is segregated (e.g., a section of the system, component, sub-component,
etc.).
19. Failure definitionThis
is a general statement of what constitutes a failure of the item in terms
of performance parameters and allowable limits for each specified output.
20. Trade-off
study reportsThese reports should identify areas of marginal
and state-of-the-art design and explain any design compromises and operating
restraints agreed upon. This information will aid in determining the possible
and most probable failure modes and causes in the system.
21. Design data
and drawingsDesign data and drawings identify each item
and the item configuration that perform each of the system functions.
System design data and drawings will usually describe the systems
internal and interface functions beginning at system level and progressing
to the lowest indenture level of the system. Design data will usually
include either functional block diagrams or schematics that will facilitate
construction of reliability block diagrams.
22. Block diagramsBlock
diagrams that illustrate the operation, interrelationships, and interdependencies
of the functions of a system are required to show the sequence and the
series dependence or independence of functions and operations. Block diagrams
may be constructed in conjunction with, or after defining the system and
shall present the system breakdown of its major functions. More than one
block diagram is sometimes required to represent alternative modes of
operation, depending upon the definition established for the system.
23. Functional
block diagramsFunctional block diagrams illustrate the
operation and interrelationships between functional entities of a system
as defined in engineering data and schematics. An example of a functional
block diagram, taken from MIL-STD-1629, is shown in Figure 7.9.
24. Reliability
block diagramsReliability block diagrams define the series
dependence, or independence, of all functions of a system or functional
group for each life-cycle event. An example of a reliability block diagram,
taken from MIL-STD-1629, is shown in Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.9. Functional
block diagram.

Figure 7.10. Reliability
block diagram.
25. Severity classificationThis
classification is assigned to provide a qualitative measure of the worst
potential consequences resulting from design error or item failure. Classifications
should be assigned to each identified failure mode and each item analyzed
in accordance with the loss statements below. It may not be possible to
identify an item or a failure mode according to the loss statements in
the four categories below, but similar loss statements based on various
inputs and outputs can be developed and included in the ground rules for
the FMECA activity. Severity classification categories that are consistent
with MIL-STD-882 are defined as follows:
- Category ICatastrophicA
failure that may cause injury or death.
- Category IICriticalA
failure which may cause severe injury, major property damage, or major
system damage that will result in major downtime or production loss.
- Category IIIMarginalA
failure which may cause minor injury, minor property damage, or minor
system damage which will result in delay or loss of system availability
or degradation.
- Category IVMinorA
failure not serious enough to cause injury, property damage or system
damage, but will result in unscheduled maintenance or repair.
These categories can be
attached to a cost or any other factor, but when used in the established
criteria, should be consistent throughout the analysis.
26. FMECA reportThe
results of the FMECA and other related analyses should be included in
a report that identifies the level of the analysis, documents the data
sources and techniques used in performing the analysis, and gives the
system definition.
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